Employee involvement in Ukrainian companies by Croucher, Richard
Middlesex University Research Repository
An open access repository of
Middlesex University research
http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk
Croucher, Richard (2010) Employee involvement in Ukrainian 
companies. International Journal of Human Resource Management, 21 
(14). pp. 2659-2676. ISSN 1466-4399 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09585192.2010.523582
Available from Middlesex University’s Research Repository at 
http://eprints.mdx.ac.uk/5107/
Copyright:
Middlesex University Research Repository makes the University’s research available electronically.
Copyright and moral rights to this thesis/research project are retained by the author and/or 
other copyright owners. The work is supplied on the understanding that any use for 
commercial gain is strictly forbidden. A copy may be downloaded for personal, non-
commercial, research or study without prior permission and without charge. Any use of the 
thesis/research project for private study or research must be properly acknowledged with 
reference to the work’s full bibliographic details.
This thesis/research project may not be reproduced in any format or medium, or extensive 
quotations taken from it, or its content changed in any way, without first obtaining permission 
in writing from the copyright holder(s).
If you believe that any material held in the repository infringes copyright law, please contact 
the Repository Team at Middlesex University via the following email address:
eprints@mdx.ac.uk
The item will be removed from the repository while any claim is being investigated.
 1
 
 
 
 
Employee involvement in Ukrainian companies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Richard Croucher 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Employee involvement in Ukrainian companies 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the hypothesis that the introduction of Western quality 
standards has brought some development of employee involvement in 
Ukrainian manufacturing and service companies and analyses the 
consequences for managements’ use of the institutions of employee 
representation.  The subject is pursued through eight case studies, four in a 
test and four in a control group.   Quality developments were driven by top 
managers and not by HR practitioners. In the test companies, managerial 
hierarchies were flattened and process orientations adopted; training was 
increased; communication was improved and in some cases team work was 
established.  These developments were largely absent in the four control 
cases.  The consequences for employee representative institutions are 
examined.  In three cases, management revived the previously anachronistic 
‘Assembly of the Working Collective’ as an employee involvement tool, 
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thereby demonstrating a preference for picking workplace institutions ‘off 
the path’ for adaptation rather than either using unions or limiting 
involvement to non-institutional modes.          
 
Introduction 
 
This article examines quality-driven employee involvement in Ukrainian 
manufacturing and service companies and its consequences for the 
institutions of employee representation, a subject on which there is no 
available scholarly literature1.  The subject is approached by eight case 
studies designed to examine the results of introducing quality management 
systems on employee involvement.  It has been argued that employee 
involvement is central to improving the historically comparatively low 
quality of products and services in post-Soviet countries (Dickenson et al, 
2000) and more widely, that employee involvement and production quality 
are linked (Chiu, 1999).  Manufacturing has been particularly important as a 
source of vital export earnings in the Twenty First Century and much of the 
country’s prosperity is tied up with it (Aslund, 2005).   
 
                                           
1 The assistance of Dr Peter Dickenson in collecting the data used in this paper is gratefully 
acknowledged.  
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Ukraine is the second largest country in the former Soviet bloc, with 
considerable strategic importance for Russia, the European Union and the 
USA. Until the ‘Orange Revolution’, minimal attention was paid to the 
country in the West, despite the loose Partnership and Co-Operation 
Agreement with the EU (Muraviov, 2007).  The prospects for ‘democratic 
development’ are clearly related to those for industrial democracy (Stiglitz, 
2000).  Should Ukrainian workplaces continue to operate in hierarchical and 
authoritarian ways, this will provide underpinning for the current high levels 
of disengagement with the wider political process after public 
disappointment post-‘Orange Revolution’.  
 
The paper is structured as follows.      First, the involvement term is defined 
and the significance of quality improvement as a driver for increased 
involvement is outlined.  Second, the Ukrainian context is introduced and it 
is argued that although this is unfavourable to the development of advanced 
forms of involvement, quality interventions provide the occasion for certain 
limited advances. Third, we introduce our research question and hypothesis.  
Fourth, our case study method is outlined prior to reporting results from our 
cases.  Finally, conclusions are drawn.   
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Employee Involvement and quality 
 
Competing definitions of the terms ‘involvement’ and ‘participation’ have 
been widely discussed but here we discuss ‘involvement’.  The term is often 
used interchangeably with ‘participation’ (see for example Harley et.al., 
2005).  Involvement and participation are clearly not entirely separate in 
practice, and one may theoretically be linked to the other.   We use the term 
here to designate any practice that seeks to involve employees in senses  
over and above what could be expected in Taylorist working environments 
such as typically encountered in Ukrainian workplaces.   Typical forms of 
involvement identified in Western contexts are communications practices 
such as briefing groups, regular meetings between management and the 
workforce or parts of it and team working either of a permanent or problem-
solving type (Bryson, 2004).  Vidal (2007) distinguishes between two types 
of involvement, with ‘substantive’ and ‘nominal empowerment’; in the 
former, there are high levels of trust; workers are consulted extensively and 
are as a minimum permitted to take a wide range of decisions over the way 
that work is done.  The latter involves lower levels of trust, much less 
consultation and employee autonomy is confined essentially to a small 
range of low level decisions on operational issues.   
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‘Nominal empowerment’ may be used to transcend inherited management 
difficulties in managing workers who have inherited traditions that are a 
legacy from Soviet times.  Pre-1989,  the workplace situation was 
characterised as ‘workers’ negative control’ (Arnot, 1988,  Filtzer, 1986) 
since although workers had no decision-making powers over what was to be 
produced (except nominally at the societal level), they had a degree of 
influence over how to achieve plans.  Managements’ collaboration with 
workforces pre-1989 to achieve targets reinforced the idea of the ‘labour 
collective’ as a community facing external challenges.  The ‘labour 
collective’ as an idea had a concrete form in the ‘Assembly of the Working 
Collective’ where all met together to discuss issues in the workplace.  This 
concrete manifestation is symbolic of a wider ’culture of labour’  and has 
been used to explain post-Soviet workers’ consent to the hardships of 
transition (Shershneva and Feldhoff, 1999; Ashwin, 1999).   In the eyes of 
managers post-1989, the Assembly itself (discussed further below) came 
into the category of a Soviet institution of little relevance.   On the other 
hand, at least ‘nominal empowerment’ (if not more) was necessary not only 
to overcome traditions of employee resistance to managerial initiative but 
also for more positive reasons.     
 
Increased involvement is encouraged by drivers with high legitimacy with 
managers.  Marchington and Wilkinson (2000) have argued the importance 
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of product and service markets for encouraging employee involvement in 
companies in Western Europe and in Ukraine this is an imperative shared 
widely by managers in export-oriented companies.  There is strong evidence 
from other developing economies that High Performance Work Systems are 
most successfully implemented in companies with quality improvement 
strategies (Bae and Lawler, 2000).   Foreign markets demand increased 
quality from Ukrainian manufacturing and service companies. Quality 
management as theorised in Western management literature requires 
increased levels of employee involvement.  Three of the five main elements 
of quality management (continuous improvement, team-working, and 
employee involvement more generally) require that employee involvement 
be addressed, and constitute the majority (along with benchmarking and 
customer focus, also arguably requiring employee involvement) of the 
factors discussed as significant in the management literature. These 
elements are in sharp contrast to the command and control modes of 
operation, and the hierarchical, vertically-integrated and bureaucratic 
structures traditional in the Former Soviet Union.   
 
A related subject, that of employee involvement and participation schemes 
and their impact on workers’ democratic participation in enterprises has 
been much debated in the West.  The subject is not exactly the same as ours, 
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since in the case of quality systems a prior question exists, i.e. whether the 
systems foster involvement at all.   Ramsay (1977; 1992) expressed 
scepticism from a Marxist viewpoint, in the tradition of Carter Goodrich 
whose classic (1920: 253) formulation, was that such schemes involved 
workers increasing their control ‘by admission’, and they should be ‘left out 
of account unless…they are shown to involve workers’ activity’.  Ramsay 
argued that, at the societal level, there was a cycle of interest in these 
schemes; interest arose when capital was challenged, and subsided as the 
challenge receded.  For Ramsay, if workers’ control was not established 
(and management would in practice cede no real control short of that, i.e. 
unless compelled to by force majeure) then participation was a sham.  For 
Goodrich and Ramsay involvement was simply the first step on an industrial 
democratic road, but these terms of reference are not very relevant to the 
Ukrainian context.  
 
 The alternative viewpoint derived from more restricted societal terms of 
reference. This has been that parts of some such schemes can be 
‘empowering’ especially when they involve team work, because they can 
increase workers’ control over their immediate working practices (Harley, 
2000).  However, this depends on the actual degree of autonomy over work 
granted to the teams in relation to the degree of direct supervision and the 
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nature of internal control systems such as the role of the team leader 
(Harley, 2000; Benders, 2005).  Communication is recognised as an 
important element in providing employees with voice and, provided there 
are adequate channels for upward communication, can increase involvement 
if not to the high levels regarded as significant by Ramsay (Marchington, 
2005).  Marchington (2005), revisiting this debate recently proposed that 
involvement schemes should be categorised at workplace level on a number 
of more modest dimensions than those proposed by Ramsay.  These 
dimensions are: degree (the extent to which workers could actually 
influence management on any subject), scope (the extent to which the 
decisions influenced could be said to be strategic), level (whether this was at 
the local, departmental or company level) and form (direct, face to face, or 
indirect through representatives).   
 
However, this literature largely preceded recent developments in neo-
institutionalist theory (Whitley, 2000; Hall and Soskice, 2001; Amable, 
2003).  Although neo-institutionalist analysis operates at the national-
systemic and not the organisational level, it nevertheless contains elements 
relevant to the latter.  The first is the nature of the managerial hierarchy 
itself.  Where these are (as in the Soviet system) extensive and vertically 
integrated, the authority system is relatively formal and the large number of 
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layers of management do not facilitate employee involvement (Whitley, 
2000).  The second is training, which raises management interest in 
attempting to retain employees especially where they have acquired non-
firm specific (quality control) skills likely to enhance their labour 
marketability (Ibid.).  This tends to increase their interest in improving the 
quality of working life for employees, inter alia by improving their 
involvement and job control, not least to forestall their marketing their skills 
to other employers.  These two additional elements are therefore significant 
facilitative factors for employee involvement.    
 
Quality and involvement in the Ukrainian Context  
 
In Ukraine, levels of employee autonomy in carrying out job tasks are low 
in West European terms.  The involvement concept was essentially 
unknown in Soviet enterprises and remains obscure to most Ukrainian 
practitioners.   Soviet management systems were strictly hierarchical 
organisational structures and authoritarian cultures which made no effort to 
generate genuine employee involvement.  The central concern was with 
fulfilling the planned outputs by use of coercive mechanisms and workers 
whose outputs could be identified as falling short of quality standards were 
rebuked or disciplined (Kornai, 1992).  Before 1989, there was in Ukraine a 
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well developed institutional quality infrastructure based around the state 
standards body Gosstandart who issued a comprehensive set of technical 
standards (Hill and McKay 1986). A large cadre of quality professionals 
was deployed in industry and educational institutions in addition to those in 
the state standards organisation. A ‘fitness for purpose’ definition of quality 
was used similar to that used in the West in the 1960s, and in the 1980s a 
debate took place on developing a quality system similar to the Western ISO 
9000. A consequence was the introduction in the late eighties of the 
‘Complex System for the Management of Quality’ that had similarities to an 
ISO 9000 approach, in particular a detailed set of externally-specified 
documentation alongside the ‘traditional’ arrangements but without any 
recommendations for worker involvement.  The difficulty of overcoming 
historic legacies has been a theme of writings on quality management in 
Eastern Europe: in Poland, (Kindlarski, 1996), and in Russia (Pooley and 
Welsh 1994), where lack of worker involvement is seen as a major barrier.  
Worker involvement is likely to be hard to achieve in many workplaces 
because of high levels of unresolved conflict which Ashwin (2004: 35) 
describes as ‘endemic’ in Russian workplaces.  Using Vidal’s distinction, 
the levels of involvement demanded by quality initiatives envisaged by 
Ukrainian managements are therefore likely to fall largely into the 
‘nominal’ category, but as he notes, even within this category the level of 
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involvement is likely to vary between companies and in practice may 
exceed what was initially envisaged.    
 
 
Two main quality systems are discussed in the Ukrainian context: ISO 9000 
and Total Quality Management (TQM).  While other models exist, such as 
the European Foundation for Quality Management’ Excellence Model, and 
Business Process Re-Engineering, these are not widely discussed in Ukraine 
possibly because they require even greater change from management.  ISO 
9000 is a management system based on documents devised by the 
International Standards Organization that specifies methods of organization 
to improve product or service quality. To adopt the standard, a firm will 
draw up a set of documents modelled on the ISO framework and then 
implement them in their operations. The documents themselves and the way 
they are used are regularly checked and approved by an independent 
certification body. The standard specifies that implementation requires in-
depth involvement both within management and, crucially, in the workforce 
more widely since only this can improve ‘first time’ quality and reduce the 
need for rectification of inadequate products or services. The effectiveness 
of  ISO 9000 is contested. A survey conducted by the European Union (EU) 
criticised it for not dealing adequately with employee involvement, and too 
focused on production and a limited number of support processes (EU, 
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1997). Total Quality Management (TQM) is by design more radical than 
ISO 9000, going further in breaking down hierarchies and traditional 
barriers inside firms, notably through a stronger emphasis on increased 
teamwork (Meegan and Taylor, 1997).  However, this challenges 
management to innovate radically rather than incrementally and therefore 
reduces its attractiveness.   
 
The influence of HRM might theoretically increase the prospects of 
involvement.   High levels of involvement are advocated as an important 
component of the US ‘High Performance Work Systems’ model (Pfeffer, 
1998).  Yet HR management exists in few Ukrainian companies; HRM 
generally exists in name rather than in practice, with administrative 
personnel functions carried out through the ‘Labour Department’.  While 
previous collective norms are being ‘hollowed out’ and deprived of their 
former content, ‘HR’ is only slowly moving into the vacuum (Gorton et al 
2003). Managers have been re-named ‘HR’ managers and have a very 
minor role in managerial hierarchies.  In a small minority of (usually 
foreign-owned) companies the ‘HR’ function involves more than 
administrative tasks and a degree of influence on management strategy 
more widely.  As Brewster (1995) has pointed out, ‘HRM’ in Europe is 
characterised by a selective approach to specific practices that are 
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favoured by the institutional framework in existence in particular 
countries.  In Ukraine, the framework is extremely weak in comparison 
with West European countries, and the model of HR adopted, to the extent 
that it exists at all, is much closer to an American than a European one 
since it is more reliant on external than internal labour markets and 
envisages little role for unions.  It is conditioned by employers’ strength in 
the labour market, or the fact that employees are in a weak bargaining 
position vis a vis employers.  In Ukraine, this last factor means that it is 
focussed in particular on selection methods (many of which would be 
ruled out as unethical in West European contexts) and a combination of 
financial and psychological approaches to motivation.  
 
HR is strongly influenced by the origins of those available to take these 
jobs.  While Ukraine is not as unattractive to returning nationals trained 
abroad as provincial Russia, it remains so in relation to much of the rest of 
Europe or the USA (Tung and Lazarova, 2006).  Few practitioners are 
professionally qualified and come either from those trained pre-1990 or 
from those trained more recently.  Those in the first and certainly largest 
category have one of four backgrounds: Soviet-style personnel functions, 
operations managers, psychologists or those trained pre-1989 as ‘cadre 
inspectors’, i.e. officials responsible for obtaining, inducting, disciplining 
and retaining ‘cadres’.  Those in the much smaller second category have 
 15
predominantly been trained in the Ukrainian system through the growing 
number of courses available, where American rather than European 
approaches are emphasised, often through partnerships with US business 
schools.   Graduates of these schools might seek to develop ‘HPWS’ 
approaches, but they remain at the beginning of their careers and not 
influential.  Thus, despite the existence of the second group, there is 
therefore little prospect of the majority of Ukrainian HR managers initiating 
or playing a substantial role in driving employee involvement or co-
operative production paradigms within companies.  Currently, the situation 
in many workplaces meets the theoretical criteria for abusive supervision in 
all its forms, principally because management is hierarchical and has strong 
power in relation to employees thereby fostering worker alienation and not 
involvement (Tepper, 2007).    
 
 
The current systemic context provides little support for anything other than 
minimal initiatives.  The social security safety net is under-developed in that 
falling into it poses a major threat to families’ capacity to survive.  The 
value of the minimum wage, although increased considerably, fell in real 
terms in the 1990s (Ganguli and Terrell, 2006).  This reduces employee 
confidence in job tenure and also their willingness to invest in training or a 
deeper or broader relationship with management (Harcourt and Wood, 
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2007).   Wage arrears remain common, reducing employee motivation.  So, 
too, do ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ wages whereby employers pay employees 
an ‘official’ wage including taxation and social security contributions, and a 
second, unofficial one which does not.  This practice is employer- rather 
than employee-driven since the latter are aware of its disadvantages for 
themselves.  There is an extensive ‘grey’ labour market; in its most common 
form, workers are already employed in legitimate employment, but 
supplement this by undeclared work (Williams, 2007).  This seems likely to 
reduce employees’ interest in their primary employer and to promote 
detachment rather than a wish for either involvement or participation.  
Employment legislation is weak and difficult to enforce through the legal 
system.  Works councils, a significant potential channel for participation, do 
not exist.    
      
 
Involvement and participation are potentially raised by trade unions, and 
they might stand to gain institutionally from management interest in using 
them as communications vehicles.  Yet they may not be seen as sufficiently 
representative by employers.  Trade unionism under the Soviet regime had 
mainly welfare, ‘transmission belt’ and related disciplining functions; 
relations between the majority ‘traditional’ unions and both the state and 
employers have been characterised by the term ‘the partnership of non-
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interference’ whereby government and management prerogatives are not 
challenged (But, 2001).  Between 2005 and 2007, no tripartite national 
framework labour ‘General Agreement’ was reached and previous General 
Agreements had never been implemented in full.  Union demands for 
participation at all levels are at best half-hearted because of the continued 
significance of unions’ historic integrative functions.  Their values and 
rhetorics are those of ‘protecting workers’ interests’, but this is conceived of 
in formalistic, legal and ‘watchdog’ rather than mobilisation and bargaining 
terms. Workplace collective agreements are rarely reached by anything 
resembling collective bargaining and union functions are centred on 
employee welfare. Ukrainian unions currently fall into two categories: the 
largest consists of ‘traditional’ unions (those affiliated to the Federation of 
Ukrainian Trade Unions) and the smaller grouping is some forty 
‘independent’ unions at national and local levels, affiliated to the Ukrainian 
Federation of Free Trade Unions.  The latter’s defining characteristic is that 
they were formed by workers’ initiative.  The traditional trade unions have 
been preserved both by the slow pace of economic reform in Ukraine in 
comparison with Russia and by their low levels of opposition to 
management.  reflecting the élite’s concern to avoid ‘shock therapy’ 
approaches.  The state continues to play a large part in the economy both 
directly and indirectly (Aslund, 2005).  
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Overall union membership was above 40% in 2001 and is associated with 
larger enterprises, where unions have much higher membership densities 
(Standing and Zsoldos 2001 (a); Standing and Zsoldos 2001 [b]).  Union 
structures and finances are based on the workplace, with regional and 
national levels receiving low proportions of subscription funds and therefore 
incapable of developing reform strategies (Croucher, 2000).  Independent 
unions (and notably the Independent Miners’ Union) have adopted more 
bargaining and campaigning functions, notably around the extremely poor 
safety record in Ukrainian mines (even in comparison with Russia) but face 
management-supported hostility and competition from traditional unions 
(But, 2001).  Traditional unions, stimulated and assisted by Global Union 
Federations,  are in some cases moving towards a more bargaining and 
campaigning orientation, but the changes have so far had little impact at 
workplace level and the speed of change is slow (Koliushko and 
Ukrainiskyy, 2001; Sogge, 2004; Croucher, 2004).  The unions face a 
dilemma: increasing their representative and campaigning roles carries the 
risk of ending management consent for their existence as welfare bodies 
(and with it check-off for union dues); on the other hand, they risk 
increasing irrelevance to workers if they do not take that route.   
 
Management-driven involvement may be facilitated by various forms of 
employee representation and not simply by unions.  No requirement for 
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union independence exists in the Ukrainian Constitution and employers 
have increasingly formed (and in some cases later abolished) ‘yellow’ 
trade unions (Croucher, 2004).  The Assembly of the Working Collective 
is a workplace meeting that existed pre-1989 for bringing all employees 
together to be addressed by senior managers which appears not to have 
been much used in the initial transition years.   It continues to have a legal 
status and may lawfully be used to reach workplace level collective 
agreements between employer and employees.  It therefore may represent 
an alternative to trade unions with whom it traditionally co-existed.    
 
The various possible vehicles for collective employee representation and 
their current roles are summarised in Table 1 below.   
 
Bring in Table 1 about here 
  
 
 
Management is theoretically faced with choices in terms of increasing 
employee involvement.  First, it may take no measures to involve 
employees, but as we have seen this route was taken in Soviet times and is 
seen to have failed.  Second, it may involve employees either individually or 
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through existing work groups.  This second option risks communications 
being fragmented and therefore only partially successful in some cases.  
Third, it may combine the second option with communication via one of the 
forms of representational institution listed in Table 1.  The union might have 
some representational legitimacy with workers and management, or it might 
be a ‘Yellow’ union which again could theoretically entail some degree of 
worker involvement though this is likely to be less than that for relatively 
independent unions.  Alternatively, management could seek to use the 
Assembly of the Working Collective as an alternative offering some 
benefits to management while offering some protection to workers seeking 
to exercise voice in ways that management might not approve of.     
 
The issues for exploration are therefore: how far does implementation of a 
Western quality management system raise levels of employee involvement or 
establish significant facilitative factors for such changes, and with what 
implications for HR managers and the institutions of collective employee 
representation? 
 
The hypothesis, arising from the low representative capacity of existing 
employee representation institutions is that management is not likely to 
use any of them for increasing involvement.      
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Method 
 
Two sets of cases were selected: one ‘test’ set in which attempts were being 
made to implement a quality management system (in practice, all companies 
agreeing to participate had used ISO 9000, a system that respondent 
companies thought relatively user-friendly in relation to the alternatives), 
and one ‘control’ set from broadly comparable enterprises where no such 
efforts were claimed.  These are not matched pairs, although they come 
close to satisfying the conditions for being treated as such. The two groups 
were matched for broad type of industrial activity, size (large, medium and 
small), location (the south, west and centre of Ukraine) and ownership 
arrangement (see below), and all those in the test group had implemented 
ISO 9000.   
 
Access to information about Ukrainian companies is highly problematic.  
Surveys typically have unacceptably low response rates and in-depth access 
for detailed studies is very rarely achieved, partly arising from a generalised 
fear of providing information that can be used against individuals and 
specifically because of the common practice of double book keeping and the 
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suspicion that access is sought for tax collection purposes.  The key factor in 
facilitating access in this case was the very close collaboration of the 
Ukrainian partner in the research, the Ukrainian Association for Quality. 
The Quality Association’s relationships with companies allowed high 
quality contact both with firms who had, and with those that had not, 
implemented ISO 9000. Contact with workers and trade unions at the firms 
in question was also made with the help of the Quality Association, as it 
sees itself as an independent professional body willing to work with all 
stakeholders.   
 
Cases were researched in 2001-2 by workplace tours and individual and 
small-group interviews held in Russian with the aim of ascertaining 
employer and employee perceptions. Interview times ranged from forty 
minutes to two hours.  Questions asked in both test and control cases 
focussed on employee involvement changes in the previous five years. The 
drivers and nature of employee involvement were probed using Harley’s 
(2000) and Marchington’s (2005) dimensions.  Quality control changes 
were explored in both test and control cases, although more time was spent 
on this in the test cases since such changes were not always present at all in 
the control cases.   Thirty one people were formally interviewed; sixteen of 
the interviewees were senior managers and nine were trade union (Profkom) 
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representatives; the remainder were workers.  In the latter cases, there was 
no union present and workers were interviewed directly. In addition, 
informal discussions were conducted with employees in each workplace 
during the workplace tour.  Informal discussions with employees were held 
either in small groups or individually in each case without managers present 
although management nervousness in relation to this meant that many such 
discussions were brief.  In each case, interviews with management were 
carried out at a different time from those with union representatives and 
employees.  The aim was to minimise possible impacts of management 
influence on the employees and their representatives during the interview 
process, which had potential to encourage the latter to exaggerate the extent 
of change and minimise negative impacts.  As Marchington et al (2004) 
argue, it is important to access employee views directly and to place them in 
a wider organisational context.  Results are only reported here when 
management and union/employee responses were at least broadly 
consistent.  
 
Results 
 
Details of the firms investigated are shown in Table 2 below.  
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Bring in Table 2 about here 
 
The test group companies shared two main characteristics, the first in 
respect of management structures and the second in terms of the results 
claimed.  After the introduction of the quality system, they had all to some 
extent moved away from strictly hierarchical management structures, giving 
managers roles that were more defined by processes and therefore moving 
away from the vertically-integrated hierarchies typical of Soviet 
management.   Managers in the ‘test’ companies all considered that the 
quality of their product or service was superior to those of local competitors, 
however, all conceded (or assumed) that their firms lagged behind their 
Western counterparts in this respect. This served to confirm them in their 
view that they had made progress.  Both characteristics were absent in the 
control companies.  In addition, two companies claimed improved 
efficiency and profits, with one (Test 3) suggesting that sales had been 
growing at 15-20% per annum over the previous three years.  
 
The majority of test companies showed other elements in common.  Three 
of them had implemented planned and formalised training programmes for 
all employees, although there were significant differences in the extent to 
which they evaluated the effectiveness of training.  Two of them had formal 
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communications policies with workers of all grades, and in these cases there 
were opportunities for two-way communication (Test 3 and 4).  These 
involved regular meetings of the Assembly of the Working Collective.  
These test companies had also implemented regular quality meetings 
allowing for feedback from employees.  These companies had also 
implemented team working, although the level of responsibility devolved to 
team varied.  In one case (Test 3), management delegated tasks to 
production teams and delegated them to perform quality control in-team.  In 
this case, immediate supervisors clearly played an oversight rather than a 
direct management role.  In the other (Test 4), teams were also responsible 
for production and quality but had  less delegated authority in terms of tasks 
since supervisors were more directly involved in managing the production 
process.     
 
Test case 1 was an interesting exception because it had implemented ISO 
9000 with only minor changes in labour management practice.  In this case, 
the company had a successful relationship with the German company that it 
supplied which was perceived as bringing good results.  The German 
company had made no attempt to affect its supplier’s HR practices, and this 
appeared to militate against the company changing them as a result of 
introducing the quality system.   
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The control companies in all cases retained Soviet-style hierarchical 
management structures.  Moreover, none of the control firms claimed either 
improved quality in the recent past.  Nor did they claim improved efficiency 
or profitability.  In one control case (4), the company had long-standing 
team working arrangements where ad-hoc teams of employees were 
delegated to carry out certain tasks in the ship-repair yard.  In a second 
control case (3), management had also called a meeting of the Assembly of 
the Working Collective to discuss a number of issues with the manual 
workforce.  This use of the body was less intensive than that reported by the 
test companies, since it only met once between 1999 and 2002.        
 
The results are presented in Table 3.  Where individual results such as that 
in the comments column for control case 3 are reported (i.e. the existence of 
wage arrears) it may be assumed that this is a specific external factor likely 
to impact our subject that does not exist elsewhere.    
 
Bring in Table 3 about here. 
 
 27
Thus, in terms of both team work and communications, two of the test cases 
(3 and 4) had introduced permanent team working, albeit with varying 
degrees of autonomy for the teams involved.  In one of the control cases (4), 
team working had long existed, but the teams were ad hoc and there was 
therefore little opportunity for the teams to develop as work collectives.   
Communications had also been improved in these cases, though none of the 
control cases showed improvements.   In terms of the two significant 
facilitative factors which we enumerated, managerial hierarchies and 
training, the results are clear.  In all of the test and none of the control cases, 
the managerial hierarchy was changed and in three of them the number of 
layers of management was reduced.  In three of the test cases and none of 
the control cases, training was carried out on a planned basis, although it 
should be noted that appraisal systems did not operate in any of the eight 
companies and that planned training could not therefore achieve high 
degrees of personal tailoring to individual needs.      
 
 
The cases may be reviewed in terms of Marchington’s (2005) dimensions 
for measuring employee involvement; degree (the extent to which workers 
could actually influence management on any subject), scope (the extent to 
which the decisions influenced could be said to be strategic), level (whether 
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this was at the local, departmental or company level) and form (direct, face 
to face, or indirect through representatives).  In degree terms, employees felt 
in three of the test cases (2,3,4) that management had modified their 
proposals on work organisational issues as a result of their expressed views.  
In two of these cases (2 and 3), the instances were in part of the company 
and in the third (4) were company wide.  This had also occurred in one 
section in control case 4, as a result of a threatened strike by the 
independent union representative in one section of the shipyard.  The 
immediate cause of the threat was changed job roles as a result of attempts 
to improve quality, but the underlying cause was low piece work earnings in 
that section.  It did not therefore reflect any shift towards a more co-
operative paradigm.  In scope terms, job control was reported as enhanced 
in those cases in which team work had been brought in, particularly in test 
case 3 where supervisors had little more than an oversight role.  No similar 
effects were present in any control case.  In terms of level, where team work 
had been introduced this was for all operative grades, whether clerical or 
manual. In all of these companies, some workers remained only formally 
attached to teams because of their relatively free-standing roles.  In form 
terms, two of the test cases (3 and 4) involved a direct exchange between 
senior management and employees at the meeting of the working collective; 
the example of control case 4 was clearly one of discontent channelled 
through a union representative.         
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Discussion and Conclusion 
 
One contribution of this paper has been to show the significance of 
Western quality improvement schemes as a driver of limited forms of 
employee involvement. These results are consistent with those of Bae and 
Lawler (2000) for South Korea, who also found that that quality and 
speed of delivery requirements were drivers of employee involvement 
and stress the significance of selling into international markets as a causal 
factor.  The external and bureaucratic nature of the driver places strict 
limits on the depth of the involvement, but these companies remain 
innovative in the Ukrainian context and may play a role in establishing 
the concept more firmly in the country.  The paper also contributes to 
understanding of the way that both HRM and the institutions of employee 
representation are evolving at institutional level.  The revival of the pre-
1989 Assembly of the Working Collective at management behest shows 
how case study work at the enterprise level, though difficult, can bring 
results that would not be apparent from national-level research.      
 
   The study’s limitations are evident.  The content, interactions and 
complementarities between the different practices touched on here, and their 
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impact on employee involvement requires further investigation.  
Observational or participative methods of research would be preferable 
given the complexity of the issues involved but will require excellent depth 
of access that is likely to be difficult to obtain given the problems with 
quality of access in post-Soviet countries.     
 
The issues for exploration were how far does implementation of a Western 
quality management system raise levels of employee involvement, and 
establish significant facilitative factors for such changes, and with what 
consequences for workers’ representative institutions? In respect of the first 
question, the reply must be positive. The strong perception in Ukraine that 
poor service and product quality hinders their efforts in global markets has 
created an equally strong consensus within many companies working at that 
level that employee involvement in production must be greatly improved.  
Moreover, the changes were driven by the most senior managers and both of 
these factors mean that the changes are likely to be permanent.    
 
The changes were made with only marginal involvement in the executive 
aspects of the tasks by HR managers, who did not improve their position in 
the managerial hierarchy, nor their influence within it. An interesting 
question for further investigation is whether the demonstration to other 
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managers that substantial employee involvement developments do not in 
fact require strategic interventions by HR managers will have lasting 
negative effects for the development of HRM.  It has been suggested that to 
move from ISO 9000 to TQM requires increased levels of understanding 
and motivation by employees (Meegan and Taylor, 1997); whether this will 
provide more of an opening for HR managers to establish themselves 
remains to be seen.   
 
The effects on the management structures themselves were substantial.  The 
impact is partly symbolic: the re-organisation of management hierarchies 
that was universally present in the test companies emphasised the enterprise 
as a collective rather than as a hierarchy.  Workers welcomed these 
developments because it improved managers’ understandings of the 
productive process and the difficulties that they often faced with respect to 
outmoded machinery, equipment and processes.  The quality training also 
demonstrated companies’ willingness to take the risk of investing in 
employees despite having enhanced their employability by improving their 
non firm-specific skills.   
 
Simultaneously, managements have sought to guard against allowing 
involvement to spill over into significant and permanent strengthening of 
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workers’ collective voice.  Their choice of ISO 9000 and rejection of the 
more radical alternatives itself reflects a desire to proceed incrementally 
with change, even though adoption of ISO 9000 was generally represented 
as the beginning of a larger and possibly longer project involving other 
schemes such as TQM.  In one case, relatively little employee involvement 
developed.  There has been considerable discussion about the export or 
otherwise of HR methods by West European companies to their partners or 
subsidiaries in the rest of the world.  There was only one example among 
our cases of a company (Test 1) that had a strong partnership with a German 
customer company.    The case is consistent with other researchers’ 
findings, when they have suggested that Western companies do not seek to 
export employee involvement methods to others (Norwegian paper in EID).  
It is interesting in that in this case the employees rejected an approach from 
trade unionists in a neighbouring factory to establish a trade union.  It 
appears that the generally positive informal relations in a small company 
with relatively good economic prospects deterred the employees from 
seeking representation.  The fact that the German customer company was 
satisfied with quality levels achieved by a combination of training in 
Germany and informal methods in Ukraine may even have constituted a 
block to more formalised or developed involvement schemes.   
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In respect of our second question, the answer is that there was an observable 
effect.  Forms of involvement ranged from relatively strong ones that 
concretely changed management plans with respect to work organisation to 
weak ones that did not.  The farthest that any company went in allowing 
workers significant autonomy in job control terms was in test 3, where 
teams came close to ‘self-managing’ in the immediate productive sense, and 
this represented a polar case.  
 
 Although our results are uneven, the conclusion must be that quality 
systems constitute a significant driver of Harley’s job-control related 
employee involvement in Ukraine.  These are undoubtedly ‘by admission’ 
as Goodrich (1920) would have it, or in other words by management 
consent, since they involved no self-activity by workers.  The results are 
unquestionably extremely limited in West European terms, bounded as they 
are by wider environmental factors; they nevertheless constitute significant 
developments in the Ukrainian context.   
 
One striking feature of the cases is that they demonstrate a significant 
involvement gap between those companies that went in for ISO 9000 and 
those that did not.  This may to some extent undermine the common 
argument that the ISO scheme is inadequate; it appears that its rather 
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bureaucratic and limited nature may in fact increase its appeal to Ukrainian 
managers seeking to take initial steps along an uncertain path.  It may also 
be the case that companies that were already predisposed to extend 
employee involvement were prepared to go in for ISO 9000.  There is 
indeed some evidence of this, but there is also much evidence that 
introduction of the scheme itself brought significant changes and it seems 
unlikely that these changes would have occurred outside of the schemes’ 
introduction.  It therefore seems likely that what is emerging in Ukraine is a 
sizeable divergence in employee involvement terms between those 
companies that implement these schemes and those that do not, a difference 
that is largely coterminous with strongly-and weakly-export oriented 
companies.        
 
There was also a difference within the test group.  The introduction of these 
schemes threw up no union activity and the cases generated no evidence that 
these developments are strengthening existing trade unions.  Rather to the 
contrary.  In no case had unions played any significant role in the 
introduction of the quality system, nor had they reaped any benefits from it.  
Indeed, the only substantial union activity revealed in any of the cases was 
that in control case 4, when an earnings issue arose, initiated by an 
independent union.  None of our cases involved management-driven 
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(‘Yellow’ in Ukrainian parlance) trade unions, nor (perhaps unsurprisingly 
given the management effort involved) did management establish one in the 
period of research in any of these cases.  Instead, managements in three of 
the eight cases (two of which involved quality innovation) saw a need for 
some vehicle for broad representation of the workforce and were not 
satisfied with simply using individuals or work groups as channels.  As a 
result, they supplemented their other communications efforts by actively 
using an alternative institution for involvement, i.e. the ‘Assembly of the 
working collective’.  This is a case of an employee representative institution 
operating as resource rather than as a constraint on management.  In ‘path-
dependency’ terms, it is an historic (and dormant) institution that has been 
picked up by management and used for a new purpose (Schneiberg, 2007).  
Currently, this appears to be an in-company arrangement rather than one 
with a strong public aspect and whether its extension will be promoted by 
state action remains to be seen.  In Schneiberg’s US-based ‘path’, the path 
operates within regions and, at most, the national level, but in the case of the 
Assembly the institution is a Soviet one that was diffused (with variations) 
on an international basis.  This suggests that further research should address 
how it is being utilised in other post-Communist countries.  
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The hypothesis advanced earlier is therefore only partly upheld.   Existing 
unions have not had strong representative or involving functions, and have 
therefore been by-passed as predicted.  Managements used the Assembly 
because they sought a form of employee voice over which they could 
exercise substantial control, and this may in turn reduce the space available 
for unions effectively to reform and present themselves as viable ‘social 
partners’.  Management could call and end meetings as they wished, control 
the agenda and discussion, and there was no permanent apparatus to 
question whether decisions were implemented or not.  The institution 
nevertheless had the advantage of being recognised by both law and custom. 
It had the further advantage that it did not, unlike ‘yellow’ unions, arouse 
employee expectations of funds from management for welfare purposes, 
facilities for its officials and so on.   Any extension of its role seems likely 
further reduce the space available to trade unions of all kinds, including 
‘yellow’ unions.  It may also, as suggested above, reduce the scope for HR 
managers to raise their profile in managerial hierarchies by innovating in the 
involvement area.    
 
Overall, in Ukraine, it appears that there may be two emerging models of 
involvement.  One is ‘direct’ and to that extent similar to a US model, a 
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second combines direct and weakly-institutionalised indirect methods and is 
therefore similar to a dilute version of the European model.   
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Table 1: Vehicles for Collective Employee Representation in Ukraine 
 
Vehicle Current role 
Assembly of the working 
collective 
Occasional downward 
communication 
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Yellow’ trade union Majority role: welfare and 
downward communication. 
Minority role: compliant 
voice’ for employees 
Traditional trade union Majority role: welfare. 
Minority role: ‘watchdog’ 
Developing role: 
representative 
Independent trade union Representation and voice 
 
Table 2 Details of the cases studied. 
Type of western 
quality 
management 
method used. 
Case number Nature of 
business 
Ownership 
arrangement.  
Origin 
Test case 1 ISO 9000 Firm 1 Manufacturer of 
aluminium 
fittings 
Private  
(OAO-open 
shareholding 
society) 
Former st
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Control case 1 None Firm 2 Building 
construction 
company 
Private 
(OAO) 
Former st
Test case 2 
Control case 2 
ISO 9000 Firm 3 Testing 
laboratory and 
training centre  
Private 
(OAO) 
New 
company
None Firm 4 Testing 
laboratory 
State  State 
Test case 3 ISO 9000 Firm 5 Paint 
manufacturer 
Private 
(ZAO- closed 
shareholding 
society) 
Former st
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Control case 3 None Firm 6 Construction 
company 
Private 
(ZAO) 
Former st
Test case 4 
Control case 4 
ISO 9000 Firm 7 Shipping 
equipment 
manufacturer. 
Private 
(OAO) 
Former st
None Firm 8 Shipbuilding and 
repair 
State State 
 
 
Table 3: Reported developments in management structure and 
employee involvement practices in previous five years 
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Firm  Management 
structure 
Communications 
with employees 
Formalised 
team-work 
Training Comments 
Test 1 Removed 
majority of 
middle 
management 
No formal policy; 
weak informal 
communications, 
mainly 
downward. 
absent Ad hoc 
training 
Test 2  Redeployed 
four managers 
from solely 
supervisory 
roles, to 
quality-related 
roles  
No formal 
policy but high 
levels of 
informal 
communication 
including 
upward 
absent Formally 
planned but 
manual 
training 
strictly 
limited by 
budget 
Test 3 Redeployed 15 
managers from 
supervisory to 
training roles 
Highly developed 
communications.  
Written policy to 
communicate with 
all grades.  
Permanent 
team work 
including 
quality function
and supervisors 
Highly 
developed 
training and 
development 
programme 
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Informal 
communications, 
including 
upwards, at 
moderate level.  
have oversight 
role 
for all levels 
of employee 
Test 4 Redeployed 8 
managers to 
tteam 
supervision and 
tquality-related 
training roles 
Highly developed 
communications.  
Written policy to 
communicate with 
all grades.  Strong 
informal 
communications 
including upward.
Permanent 
team work but 
supervisors 
play 
interventionist 
role 
Planned 
training 
Control 1 Hierarchical, 
vertically-
integrated 
Highly formalised 
downward. Weak 
informal 
including 
upwards.   
Absent Moderate 
levels 
management 
training.  Ad 
hoc for other 
grades. 
Control 2 Hierarchical, 
vertically-
Low level 
downward  and 
Absent Ad hoc for all 
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integrated upward 
communications 
grades 
Control 3 Hierarchical, 
vertically-
integrated 
Highly formalised 
downward. Weak 
informal 
including 
upwards.   
Absent Ad hoc for all 
grades 
Sizeable wage 
arrears 
Control 4 Hierarchical, 
vertically-
integrated 
Minimal 
downward formal. 
Weak informal 
including 
upwards. 
Limited ad-hoc 
team work 
Ad hoc for all 
grades 
Strike threatened 
by independent 
union over piece 
rates in one section
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
